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Summary: Germany and Poland are the two largest EU members in 
Central Europe. Although they are neighbouring countries, their his-
torical situation and perspectives, and thus their expectations and 
motivations regarding EU membership, differ greatly. The two states’ 
legal systems, on the other hand, are largely similar. This article aims 
to compare how the two countries’ constitutional preconditions deter-
mine how their constitutional courts approach the integration of Com-
munity law. It also aims to point out similarities and differences be-
tween the courts’ approaches. Furthermore, it seeks to illuminate the 
diffi cult relationship between constitutional courts and the European 
Court of Justice and indicate possible ways of mitigating these theo-
retical and practical diffi culties in the future.
 
I. Introduction
Even in its preparatory stage, the integration of the Central European 
states which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 was conducted 
in accordance with the rule of law principle, leading to the harmonisation 
of national legal orders with Community law. Until these states acceded, 
however, this took place exclusively through the national legislator, as 
EC law did not yet enjoy direct applicability, and the failure to implement 
it did not entail direct legal sanctions. Since accession, however, the law 
of the European Union forms an integral part of national legal orders, 
and secondary Community law has acquired legal force with regard to 
citizens and states, with the national legislator unable to directly infl u-
ence its content. 
Poland is not only the largest of the states that joined the European 
Union in 2004, but can also look back on a longer period of development 
leading to sovereignty than most of the other post-communist states 
of Central Europe. Due to this circumstance, my contribution will also 
focus on how the Polish Constitutional Court makes allowance for the 
preservation of national sovereignty and, at the same time, grants prior-
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ity to Community law. In this context, a comparison will be made with the 
approaches of the German Constitutional Court, which emerged from a 
previous period of democratisation in Central Europe, and which may be 
considered the archetype of Central European constitutional courts.1 
II. A Brief Historical Overview of Polish Constitutional Jurisdiction
The development of constitutional jurisdiction in Poland did not be-
gin until the rise of the Solidarność (Solidarity) movement in 1980, when 
the fi rst claims for such jurisdiction arose.2 On 26 March 1982, during the 
period of martial law, a constitutional amendment was passed which laid 
the foundations for the creation of a state tribunal and a constitutional 
court. After long debates, the Constitutional Tribunal Act was passed as 
late as 29 April 1985. However, the Act did not grant the Constitutional 
Tribunal (Trybuna  Konstytucyjny) a fi nal legal effect; rather, it could still 
be overruled by a two-thirds majority in the Sejm, which was the coun-
try’s only parliamentary chamber at that time.3 Using its predominance 
in the Sejm, the Communist Party could practically decide on its own 
concerning constitutional issues until the year 1989, and no independ-
ent judiciary was able to break the communist doctrine of the unity of 
state powers. Despite the political upheaval of 1989, the binding force of 
Constitutional Tribunal decisions was not put in place until 17 October 
1997, when Poland’s new constitution came into force. Only from that 
moment on did the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny have all of the characteristics 
of a modern European constitutional court. Nevertheless, the Trybuna  
had already begun developing a culture of constitutional jurisprudence 
after 1989, using its decisions to support the Republic of Poland’s devel-
opment into a rule of law state.
III. Comparison of Preconditions Concerning EC Matters in the 
Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic 
of Poland
In order to compare the approaches of German and Polish constitu-
tional jurisprudence to Community law, it is fi rst necessary to determine 
to what extent the constitutional foundations of these two states permit 
the adoption of one another’s judicial approaches.
1  Cf Zdeněk Kühn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several 
(Early) Predictions’ (2005) 3 German Law Journal 6.
2  Cabinet of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, The Constitutional Tribunal in 
Poland (Biuro Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, Warsaw 2002) 27.
3  Ibid 27.
517CYELP 3 [2007] 515-531
1. Competences of the constitutional courts
The BVerfG4 and the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny are competent to per-
form a fi nal and generally binding review of the laws and other acts of 
public power submitted to them in constitutional complaint procedures 
(Art 93 para 1 No 4a GG;5 Art 188 No 5 in conjunction with Art 79 para 
1 PC6); to decide in disputes between constitutionally recognised state 
organs with respect to their powers (Art, 93 para 1 No 1 GG; Art 189 PC); 
to perform reviews of norms both abstract (Art 93 para 1 No 2 GG; Art 
188 in conjunction with Art 191 PC) and concrete (Art 100 para 1 GG; Art 
193 PC); and to carry out several other different kinds of procedures.7 The 
Polish Constitution also expressly mentions the review of international 
treaties according to constitutional standards (Art 188 No 1). However, 
the BVerfG also decides on national laws ratifying international treaties, 
so that there are no factual differences in competence between the two 
constitutional courts. The BVerfG and the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny thus 
have equal competences concerning international law. 
2. Constitutional bases for the integration of Community law 
a) Position and wording of the constitutional authorisation to transfer com-
petences to Community organs
There are two provisions in the German Grundgesetz dealing with the 
transfer of sovereign powers to international institutions: Art 24 para 1 
and Art 23 para 1 s 2 GG.8 The fi rst difference between these two authoris-
ing provisions is in their wording: Art 23 para 1 s 2 requires the consent of 
the Bundesrat in order to transfer national sovereign rights. Furthermore, 
there is a difference in the systematic position of the two provisions: in Art 
24 para 1 the authorising provision stands alone, and refers abstractly to 
international institutions as the possible recipients of sovereign national 
powers, while the authorising provision in Art 23 para 1 s 2 applies exclu-
4  Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany).
5  Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) of 23 May 1949. 
6  Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2 April 1997.
7  See the procedures listed in § 13 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz and Art 2 et seq of the 
Polish Constitutional Tribunal Act.
8  Art 24 para 1 GG: ‘The Federation may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to inter-
national organisations.’
Art 23 para 1 GG: ‘1. With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of 
Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union, which is committed 
to democratic, social and federal principles, the rule of law, and the principle of subsidi-
arity, and which guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to 
that afforded herein. 2. To this end, the Federation may transfer sovereign rights by law 
with the consent of the Bundesrat.’ 
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sively to the national objective of European integration.9 This authorising 
provision and, indeed, the entire Art 23 GG constitutes a special provision 
of Art 24 para 1 GG,10 and takes priority over it. 
The Polish Constitution, however, contains only one provision dealing 
with the transfer of sovereign powers to ‘international organisations’, ie Art 
90 para 1.11 This provision neither refers directly to the European Union 
nor is similar in its wording to Art 24 para 1 GG, because it permits the 
transfer of the competences of state organs to international institutions in 
‘certain matters’ by virtue of international agreements, whereas Art 24 para 
1 GG only refers abstractly to ‘sovereign powers’. Finally, the systematic 
position of the Polish authorising provision in the sources of law chapter 
differs from the German provision’s place in the chapter on the Federation 
and the states, which defi nes the foundations of the German state.12
b) Provision protecting the basic structure of the Grundgesetz 
Art 23 para 1 s 1 GG also contains a provision which prevents the 
structure of the Grundgesetz from being changed.13 It makes certain re-
quirements of the European Union, which is bound by the basic constitu-
tional structures of the Federal Republic of Germany and must provide a 
standard of fundamental rights protection which is basically comparable 
to that of the Grundgesetz. Such a provision expressly protecting the con-
stitutional structure is not found in the Polish Constitution. 
c) Provisions on the priority of international law
The Polish Constitution contains a provision establishing the princi-
ple of the priority of international treaties (Art 91 para 2) and laws estab-
lished by international organisations (Art 91 para 3) over domestic law.14 
9  Cf Rupert Scholz in Theodor Maunz and Günter Dürig (eds), Grundgesetz Kommentar 
(Beck, Munich September 2006) art 23 recital 36. 
10  Cf Claus Dieter Classen in Hermann Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein and Christian Starck 
(eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (5th edn Vahlen, Munich 2005) art 23 para 1 recital 1; 
Scholz (n 9) art 23 recital 6, 49 et seq.
11  Art 90 para 1 PC: ‘The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, 
delegate to an international organisation or international institution the competence of or-
gans of state authority in relation to certain matters.’
12  Before amendment of the current version of Art 23 GG, there was a provision declaring 
the reunifi cation of Germany as a national objective. Its position was to be fi lled by an ‘Ar-
ticle for European Unifi cation’; see Scholz (n 9) art 23 recital 1; BGBl II 889.
13  Bundestags-Drucksache 12/6000; Scholz (n 9) art 23 recital 5, 54 et seq.
14  Art 91 para 2 PC: ‘An international agreement ratifi ed upon prior consent granted by 
statute shall have precedence over statutes if such an agreement cannot be reconciled with 
the provisions of such statutes.’ 
Art 91 para 3 PC: ‘If an agreement, ratifi ed by the Republic of Poland, establishing an in-
ternational organization so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly and 
have precedence in the event of a confl ict of laws.’
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In its Art 25, the Grundgesetz only designates general rules of interna-
tional law as an integral part of federal law, with priority over domestic 
law.15 Laws established by international organisations are not explicitly 
mentioned in the Grundgesetz. 
d) Modifi cation of the Community’s contractual basis
Art 23 para 1 s 3 GG delimits the transmission of sovereignty powers 
to the European Union by making a cross-reference to Art 79 para 2 and 
3 GG. Firstly, by reference to Art 79 para 2, it requires a qualifi ed major-
ity vote (as in the case of a constitutional amendment) should an amend-
ment of the contractual foundations of the European Union directly or 
indirectly affect the validity of the Grundgesetz.16 Secondly, by reference 
to Art 79 para 3 GG, which in turn refers to the unalterable principles of 
Art 1 and 20 GG, it limits European integration under material law.
Unlike Art 23 para 1 s 3 GG, the Polish Constitution does not refer 
to a legislative procedure for constitutional amendments, yet its Art 90 
para 2 imposes even higher requirements for parliamentary majorities. 
Indeed, both the procedure under Art 90 para 2 PC and the procedure 
for constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in the Sejm. 
Contrary to the constitutional amendment procedure pursuant to Art 
235 PC, which requires only a simple majority in the Senate, the proce-
dure under Art 90 para 2 PC requires a two-third majority in the Senate. 
However, such a legislative procedure largely corresponds to the German 
procedure under Art 79 para 2 GG, concerning ratifi cation of the estab-
lishment or revision of international law principles involving a transfer 
of sovereignty powers. Unalterable provisions like those listed in Art 79 
para 3 GG do not exist in the Polish Constitution,17 although this does 
not mean that they cannot be defi ned by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
3. Extent to which decisional principles can be transplanted from the 
German Constitutional Court to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
It is questionable to what extent the differing constitutional founda-
tions described above permit the adoption of German decisional princi-
ples by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The very similar procedural 
competences of both courts do not, at least, give any reason for differing 
jurisprudence concerning Community law matters. 
15  Art 25 GG: ‘The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal 
law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the 
inhabitants of the federal territory.’ 
16  Scholz (n 9) art 23 recital 78.
17  Cabinet of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal (n 2) 30.
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Differences concerning the specifi city of authorisation provisions 
can only hinder the adoption of decisional principles if the legal culture 
taking over these principles has narrower legal boundaries. Since the 
authorisation provision of the Polish Constitution (Art 90 para 1 PC) is 
broader than that of the Grundgesetz, it therefore cannot be an obstacle 
to the adoption of decisional principles.
The non-existence of a provision in the Polish Constitution protect-
ing the basic constitutional structure also means that requirements for 
protecting national constitutional values can be defi ned by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal, which could also adjust its requirements to those given 
in Art 23 para 1 s 1 GG. 
Differences concerning provisions on the priority of international law 
and laws made by international organisations (Art 25 GG; Art 91 para 2 
and 3 PC) can be seen as merely declarative, since the priority of Commu-
nity law is a customary principle of jurisprudence all over Europe, and is 
also applied in German jurisprudence. 
The ratifi cation procedures in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Republic of Poland for international treaties entailing the transmis-
sion of state competences to international organisations are almost iden-
tical, so that the constitutional preconditions for the EC law jurispru-
dence of their constitutional courts cannot differ, either. 
The non-existence of unalterable constitutional principles in the 
Polish Constitution,18 such as those given in Art 79 para 3 GG, does not 
necessarily imply a different approach to collisions between EC law and 
domestic constitutional law. After all, there is a hierarchy of constitu-
tional values here, too, as in German legal culture.19 
The constitutional differences between Germany’s Grundgesetz and 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland do not, therefore, form an 
obstacle to the adoption of BVerfG decisional principles by the Trybuna  
Konstytucyjny. 
IV. Decisions by the German Constitutional Court Concerning EC Law 
and Comparison to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s Approach
1. Relationship between Community law and national law
a) Priority of Community law versus supremacy of constitutional law 
The European Community can only be an effective community of law 
if the applicability and interpretation of its law is consistent throughout 
the territory where it is valid.20 Furthermore, a supranational community 
18  Ibid 30.
19  See section IV 1 a) bb) et seq below.
20  Cf Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L.[1964] ECR 585.
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of law is only possible when its law is superior to national law in the event 
of a collision.21 From the ECJ’s point of view, the superiority of Com-
munity law must also apply to national constitutional law.22 As shown 
above, however, there are constitutional restrictions on the transfer of 
competences from the sphere of national sovereignty to the legislative 
organs of the European Community, whose legislation would then be 
superior to national constitutional law. This mutual entanglement23 is a 
fundamental theoretical problem which needs to be solved by national 
constitutional courts and the ECJ.24 
aa) Statements by the BVerfG
In the BVerfG’s view, Community law is part neither of national 
law nor international law, but rather forms an independent legal sys-
tem which fl ows from an autonomous legal source.25 Already in 1974 
the BVerfG stated that, in addition to the principles warranted by Art 79 
para 3 GG, it regarded the fundamental rights chapter of the Grundges-
etz as an essential part of the constitutional structure, one which cannot 
unconditionally be altered by authorising the transmission of sovereign 
powers to Community bodies.26 By the constitutional amendment of 21 
December 1992,27 these principles became a constitutional precondition, 
as set forth in Art 23 para 1 s 1 GG.  
Furthermore, the BVerfG perceives a limit to the application of Com-
munity law in Art 38 GG. In its Maastricht decision,28 it requires that laws 
which open the legal system to Community law must have some attribute 
allowing effective and precise interpretation, in order to comply with the 
democracy principle. It further explains that later essential changes in 
the ‘integration program’ are no longer covered by the national law which 
ratifi ed the Treaty.29 Legislation by European organs and institutions 
that exceeds the limits of the sovereign powers devolved to them, says the 
21  Cf Günter Hirsch, ‘Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht - Koopera-
tion oder Konfrontation?’(1996) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2457, 2458.
22  Case 6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. (n 20).
23  Hirsch (n 21) 2458. 
24  Cf Gert Nicolaysen‚ ‘Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht’ 
(1991) 1 Europarecht Beiheft 10.
25  BVerfGE 22, 293 (296); 31, 145 (173); 37, 271 (277).
26  BVerfGE 37, 271 (280, 296); affi rming 58, 1; 73, 339 (372, 375, 376); 75, 223 (235); 89, 
155 (174). For further examples, see Hirsch (n 21) 2458.
27  BGBl I 2068; Ondolf Rojahn in Ingo von Münch and Philip Kunig (eds), Grundgesetz-
Kommentar (5th edn Beck, Munich 2001) art 23 recital 1.
28  BVerfGE 89, 155.
29  BVerfGE 89, 155 (156); cf Markus Heintzen, ‘Die “Herrschaft” über die Europäischen Ge-
meinschaftsverträge - Bundesverfassungsgericht und Europäischer Gerichtshof auf Konf-
liktkurs?’ (1994) Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 564, 570.
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BVerfG, are not covered by the ratifying act.30 Should European institu-
tions act beyond the competences transferred to them (ultra vires), the 
Constitution would prevent the German state organs from applying such 
legal acts in Germany.31 
bb) Statements by the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal regards Community law and na-
tional law as two autonomous legal orders which are in interaction with 
each other.32 The Trybuna  Konstytucyjny limits the transfer of compe-
tences to the extent that this ‘would signify the inability of the Republic 
of Poland to continue functioning as a sovereign and democratic state’.33 
According to the Trybuna , neither Art 90 para 1 nor Art 93 para 3 PC 
authorise the transfer of the competence to issue legal acts or adopt de-
cisions contrary to the ‘supreme law of the Republic of Poland’.34 The 
Trybuna  emphasises that the constitution enjoys precedence in terms of 
binding force and application in the territory of the Republic, while the 
precedence of application of international agreements ‘in no way signifi es 
an analogous precedence of these agreements over the Constitution’.35
The EC and EU function based on, and within the limits of, the pow-
ers conferred to them by the Member States, pursuant to the Founding 
Treaties. Should a Community legal act exceed these limits, then the 
principle of the precedence of Community law ‘fails to apply with respect 
to such legal acts’.36 Indeed, the Trybuna  stresses that the preconditions 
for limiting the freedoms under fundamental rights, as defi ned by Art 31 
para 3, are directed only to the Polish legislator.37 In the event of an in-
surmountable confl ict between Community law and Polish constitutional 
law, the Trybuna  sees no possibility of resolving such a problem by judi-
cial means, but rather only by a modifi cation of Community provisions, 
an amendment to the Constitution, or, ultimately, Poland’s withdrawal 
from the European Union.38 
30  BVerfGE 89, 155 (156, 187).
31  Cf BVerfGE 89, 155 (188).
32  K 18/04 No 12.
33  K 18/04 No 8.
34  K 18/04 No 8.
35  K 18/04 No 11.
36  K 18/04 No 15.
37  Cf Miroslaw Wyrzykowski in Hartmut Bauer (ed), Ius publicum Europaeum: Referate und 
Diskussionsbeiträge des XII. Deutsch-Polnischen Verwaltungskolloquiums vom 20.-22. Sep-
tember 2001 in Warschau (Boorberg, Stuttgart/Munich 2002) 87ff.
38  K 18/04 No 13.
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cc) Comparison
Both the BVerfG and the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny regard the national 
constitution as the supreme source of law, whose basic structures are 
not violable by Community law. Both constitutional courts grant Com-
munity law priority exclusively over the provisions of non-constitutional 
sources, and both defi ne limits to the application of Community law in 
the basic structures of the national constitution. 
The BVerfG’s jurisprudence distinguishes three levels of constitu-
tional norms, differing in terms of their alterability by Community law: 
fi rstly, the principle framing the state’s identity in Art 1 and 20 of the 
Grundgesetz; secondly, the fundamental rights chapter of the Grundges-
etz, which cannot unconditionally be altered by authorising the trans-
mission of sovereign powers to Community bodies;39 and thirdly, the re-
maining constitutional provisions. 
The Trybuna  Konstytucyjny performs this trisection as well: fi rstly, 
there is the group of unalterable norms constituting state identity, whose 
limits may never be exceeded by the transfer of competences to Com-
munity organs; secondly, fundamental rights protection, which would 
require a constitutional amendment or a political solution in the case of a 
disaccord with Community law; and thirdly, the remaining constitutional 
provisions. Should EC organs act beyond their competences (ultra vires), 
both constitutional courts agree that the legal consequence would be the 
non-applicability of such legal acts. 
b) Is international public power bound by national constitutional law?
Concerning the issue of whether the guarantee of judicial relief un-
der Art 19 para 4 GG also refers to acts of public power by international 
institutions, the BVerfG has ruled that the Grundgesetz is valid only for 
‘the public power constituted by itself, confi ned to the arrangement of the 
German state’, and consequently excludes the guarantee of judicial relief 
against public power ‘not belonging to that arrangement’.40 The BVerfG 
states that the legislator is authorised by Art 24 para 1 GG to transfer 
sovereign powers to international institutions, which also includes desig-
nating the appropriate judicial relief.41 
As shown above, the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny states that the precon-
ditions for limiting the constitutional freedoms and rights regulated by 
Art 31 para 3 PC pertain to Poland’s legislators, not those of the Commu-
39  BVerfGE 37, 271 (280).
40  BVerfGE 58, 1 (26).
41  BVerfGE 58, 1 (28). 
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nity.42 From this it may also be concluded that Community legal organs 
are not directly bound by national constitutional law. The Trybuna  has 
made no statement concerning the guarantee of judicial relief.43 
2. Decisions concerning the competences of national judiciaries
a) Competence to review Community legal acts 
aa) Statements by the BVerfG
In its Maastricht decision, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
made the following statement concerning its competence to review Com-
munity legal acts exceeding an EC organ’s assigned competence:
If European institutions or organs were to administer or develop the 
Union Treaty in a way that would not be covered by the Treaty, the 
legal acts arising therefrom would not be binding within German 
sovereign territory. The German constitutional organs would be hin-
dered from applying those legal acts in Germany in such a case. Ac-
cordingly, the BVerfG will examine whether legal acts by European 
institutions and organs are within the limits of sovereign compe-
tences, or are ultra vires.44
The BVerfG’s competence to review Community legal acts means not 
only that there is a jurisprudence that maintains the consistency of the 
community of law and defi nes the substance and limits of the sover-
eign rights granted to Community organs, but also that the BVerfG itself 
may decide regarding the conformity of legal acts issued by Communi-
ty organs with the competences conferred to them. Moreover, German 
constitutional organs other than the BVerfG are entitled to examine the 
legality of Community acts:45 the BVerfG grants specialised courts the 
competence ‘to review [...] where the non-applicability of EC law in Ger-
many is alleged’.46 However, it seems undisputed that the BVerfG has no 
competence to review EC law with regard to its compatibility with simple 
national law.47 
42  K 18/04 No 23.
43  Regulated in Art 77 para 2 of the Polish Constitution. 
44  BVerfGE 89, 155 (188).
45  Hirsch (n 21) 2460.
46  BVerfG EuZW 1995, 412 (413).
47  Paul Kirchhof, ‘Deutsches Verfassungsrecht und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht’ 
(1991) 1 Europarecht Beiheft 11, 19.
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bb) Statements by the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny
The Polish Constitutional Court emphasises that the Member States 
retain the competence to assess 
whether or not, in issuing particular provisions, the Community (Un-
ion) legislative organs have acted within the delegated competences 
and in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and proportion-
ality. Should the adoption of provisions infringe these frameworks, 
the principle of the precedence of Community law fails to apply with 
respect to such provisions.48
Thus the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny also affi rms its competence to ex-
amine the conformity of acts by Community organs with the competences 
conferred to them. It does not authorise any state organs to exercise such 
a competence. 
b) Competence to overrule Community legal acts 
aa) BVerfG
According to the BVerfG, when national constitutional organs are 
authorised to review the legality of Community acts and are prevented 
from applying them in Germany,49 there remains the question of whether 
they also have the competence to overrule these acts, or, rather, if the 
BVerfG alone has this competence. In its Solange I decision,50 the BVerfG 
states the following: ‘Domestic laws are protected against courts which 
aim to deny their validity for constitutional reasons. [...] Therefore, the 
fundamental idea of Art 100 GG requires protection of the validity of 
Community law from invalidation in the same way as domestic law.’51 
Pursuant to Art 100 para 1 GG,52 this monopoly on decision was not over-
turned in the Solange II53 or Maastricht decisions, either.54 
bb) Trybuna  Konstytucyjny
Art 193 of the Polish Constitution prescribes that courts may make 
submissions to the Constitutional Tribunal concerning legal questions 
48  K 18/04 No 15.
49  BVerfGE 89, 155 (188).
50  BVerfGE 37, 271.
51  BVerfGE 37, 271 (284).
52  For details, see Dieter Grimm, ‘Europäischer Gerichtshof und nationale Arbeitsgerichte 
aus verfassungsrechtlicher Sicht’ (1996) Recht der Arbeit 66, 70.
53  BVerfGE 73, 339.
54  Cf Hirsch (n 21) 2461.
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on the compatibility between normative acts and ratifi ed international 
treaties, should a judicial decision depend on the answer to such ques-
tions. A ‘must’ provision like Art 100 para 1 s 1 GG does not exist in the 
Polish Constitution, nor can the Constitutional Tribunal’s monopoly on 
decision be derived from Art 193 PC. 
3. Relationship to the ECJ
According to Art 220 TEC, the ECJ holds the task of preserving Com-
munity law by consistent and binding interpretation of common legal 
sources. To this corresponds Art 234 para 3 TEC, which prescribes the 
obligation of the highest-level national courts - including constitutional 
courts - to submit questions to the ECJ for its binding decision.55 At the 
same time, however, the constitutional courts of Germany and Poland 
reserve the fi nal competence to review the validity of legal acts by Com-
munity organs, thus also including those of the ECJ. The relationship 
between constitutional courts and the ECJ is thus infl uenced by the fact 
that each side claims the competence to make binding decisions on the 
applicability of Community law, while denying such a competence to the 
other side. Does this mean a confrontation between the constitutional 
courts and the ECJ?
a) BVerfG
In its Solange I decision, the BVerfG insisted on its competence to 
review Community law regarding its conformity with German fundamen-
tal rights.56 Although it abstained from exercising this competence in its 
Solange II decision, declaring the relevant submissions by the specialised 
courts inadmissible,57 it emphasised that this abstention depended on the 
maintenance of a fundamental rights standard by Community organs, 
especially the ECJ.58 In its Bananenmarktordnung decision,59 the BVerfG 
clarifi ed that only submissions claiming a general lack of adherence by the 
Community to the fundamental rights standard would be admissible. 
While the BVerfG effectively expressed its misgivings concerning 
maintenance of the fundamental rights standard granted by the ECJ,60 it 
acknowledged this standard as being ‘essentially comparable’ to that of 
55  BVerfGE 52, 187 (201); Case 29/68 Milch, Fett- und Eierkontor v Hauptzollamt Saarbrük-
ken [1969] ECR 165, 178. 
56  BVerfGE 37, 271 (281). 
57  BVerfGE 73, 339 (387).
58  BVerfGE 73, 339 (340).
59  BVerfGE 102, 147.
60  Cf Claus Dieter Classen in Gerrit Manssen and Boguslaw Banaszak (eds), Grundrechte 
im Umbruch (Spitz, Berlin 1997) 66.
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the BVerfG following the ECJ’s development of the appropriate jurispru-
dential principles. At the same time, it issued a warning that any decline 
in this standard would lead to application of its ongoing competence to 
review and overrule Community legal acts.61 In its Maastricht decision, 
the BVerfG additionally stated that, notwithstanding its Eurocontrol I de-
cision,62 its competence to review legal acts not only extends to the ap-
plication of legal acts by German state organs, but also generally com-
prises fundamental rights protection in Germany.63 Since the ECJ is also 
a Community organ, its decisions are likewise subject to the BVerfG’s 
competence to review and overrule Community acts.64 
The BVerfG acknowledges the ECJ’s status as a lawful judge in the 
sense of Art 101 para 1 s 2 GG.65 A violation of the right to judicial relief 
occurs when a court of last instance is obligated to submit a decision to 
the ECJ pursuant to Art 234 para 3 TEC, yet arbitrarily fails to fulfi l this 
obligation. This obligation also applies to the BVerfG.66 
In its Maastricht decision, the BVerfG refers to a ‘relationship of co-
operation’ between itself and the ECJ.67 This effectively consists in the 
fact that the BVerfG’s role in ensuring the ‘applicability’ of Community le-
gal acts in Germany is dependent on the ECJ’s correct decisions concern-
ing their ‘validity’. Accordingly, the ECJ is obligated to take the BVerfG’s 
legal opinion into consideration so that the former’s decisions are granted 
a binding force in Germany, while the BVerfG is deterred from overruling 
ECJ decisions by the possible threat to the community of law. In this con-
text, the BVerfG refers to a ‘dividing line between interpretation within 
the Treaty and legislation that exceeds the limits of the Treaty and is not 
covered by the national law ratifying the Treaty’,68 and requests that the 
ECJ further interpret the TEC so as to make allowance for the limitation 
of sovereign rights and not extend the Treaty.69 
b) Trybuna  Konstytucyjny
In its decision on Poland’s membership in the European Union, the 
Trybuna  Konstytucyjny remarks that common legal provisions, espe-
61  Cf Grimm (n 52) 69.
62  BVerfGE 89, 155 (175). 
63  BVerfGE 89, 155 (175).
64  Cf Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, ‘Gemeinschaftsgericht und Verfassungsgericht - rechtsver-
gleichende Aspekte’ (1998) Juristen Zeitung 161. 
65  BVerfGE 73, 339 (366).
66  BVerfGE 37, 271 (282). 
67  BVerfGE 89, 155 (156).
68  BVerfGE 89, 155 (209).
69  BVerfGE 89, 155 (210).
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cially EC regulations applicable in the territory of the Republic of Po-
land, can be reviewed according to the national standard of fundamental 
freedoms.70 In this same decision, it also states that ‘direct review of the 
conformity with the Constitution of particular decisions of the ECJ, as 
well as the “permanent jurisprudential line” derived from these decisions, 
does not fall within the Constitutional Tribunal’s scope of jurisdiction 
(Art 188 PC)’.71
Firstly, it may be seen that the Trybuna  reserves the right to review 
legal acts with reference to the national fundamental rights standard, 
which may be viewed as parallel to the Solange I decision. Supranational 
acts of public power can also be measured according to the national fun-
damental rights standard, paralleling the BVerfG’s line in its Maastricht 
decision.72 However, the assertion that ‘direct review’ of ECJ decisions 
does not fall within the ‘scope of jurisdiction’ of the Trybuna  needs to be 
analyzed more precisely. On the one hand, this might be interpreted in 
the sense of Solange II, ie that the Trybuna  may refrain from exercising 
its competence to review particular decisions. On the other, this might 
imply that the ECJ’s task of further developing Community law is ac-
knowledged, as the BVerfG likewise did in its Kloppenburg decision.73 Un-
der which conditions the Trybuna  might abstain from its right to review 
supranational acts of public power remains an open question. In none 
of its decisions does the Trybuna  refer to examining the Community’s 
adherence to a fundamental rights standard, ie the precondition for the 
admissibility of a constitutional complaint under the BVerfG’s Bananen-
marktordnung decision.74 
The Trybuna  regards the ECJ’s competence to bindingly interpret 
Community law in the preliminary ruling procedure pursuant to Art 234 
TEC as part of the international treaties by which the Republic of Poland 
is bound.75 Furthermore, it emphasises that a submission pursuant to 
Art 234 TEC does not constitute a threat or limitation to its competences, 
and that a submission by the Trybuna  itself would constitute an exercise 
of its judicial competences.76 The Trybuna  does not, however, address 
the question of whether a national court’s violation of Art 234 para 3 TEC 
constitutes a violation of the right to legal justice in the sense of Art 45 
para 1 PC.
70  K 18/04 No 23.
71  K 18/04 No 19.
72  BVerfGE 89, 155 (175).
73  BVerfGE 75, 223 (242).
74  BVerfGE 102, 147.
75  K 18/04 No 17 p 10.
76  K 18/04 No 18 p 10.
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c) Comparison
The Trybuna  Konstytucyjny does not expressly call its relationship 
to the ECJ a ‘relationship of cooperation’, as the BVerfG does. Parallels 
between BVerfG and Trybuna  decisions cannot be analyzed in detail, as 
the Trybuna ’s jurisprudence is far less abundant than the BVerfG’s due 
to Poland’s relatively short period of membership in the European Union. 
The fundamental lines of jurisprudence do, however, reveal some paral-
lels. Both constitutional courts grant themselves the fi nal competence to 
review and overrule EC legal acts in their national territory according to 
standards embodied in the national constitution and Community trea-
ties (or national laws ratifying those treaties), to abstain from reviewing 
particular facts in cases concerning fundamental rights protection, and 
to concede their competence to further develop Community law to the 
ECJ. 
This relationship with the ECJ, which has already existed for more 
than a decade in the case of the BVerfG, cannot be called a confrontation, 
due simply to the fact that, although it has already lasted for so long, 
there have been no confl icting positions on particular decisions. Grimm 
sees a constitutional court submission to the ECJ pursuant to Art 234 
TEC as an ‘instrument of mitigation’.77 Such a submission serves, on the 
one hand, as a warning to the ECJ that the constitutional court perceives 
a violation of the Treaty. On the other hand, it provides an opportunity for 
the ECJ to become informed of the legal viewpoints of the Member States 
and come to a decision in consultation with them. Yet the mere fact that 
‘warnings’ and ‘instruments of mitigation’ may be deemed necessary by a 
constitutional judge in the event of differing legal viewpoints with a ‘con-
fl ict potential’ indicates that the current relationship among the courts 
does not represent a satisfactory solution for a community of law that is 
continuing to integrate more deeply. 
V. How to solve the fundamental theoretical problem of priority?
The theoretical collision described above between the priority of 
Community law and national constitutional orders, with its correspond-
ing diffi culties with regard to delimiting the competences of constitution-
al courts and the ECJ and its potential for confl ict, requires modifi cation 
of the Community’s legal foundations in order to achieve a satisfactory 
solution. Otherwise, continuing European integration and the success 
of the community of law will always depend on constitutional courts re-
fraining from the exercise of their right to overrule Community legal acts, 
thus adding an element of uncertainty to the Union’s functioning, espe-
77  Grimm (n 52) 69.
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cially considering the number of Member States and the often political 
nature of their constitutional court appointments. Art I-6 of the Draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, or the equivalent provision 
in the future EU Reform Treaty, would change the unwritten priority of 
EC law into a binding Community law provision, yet would not completely 
eliminate possible collisions between Community law and national con-
stitutional law, since the priority of EC law would not thereby become a 
national constitutional principle of the Member States.78 This could only 
happen through amendment of their national constitutions. 
The problem of fundamental rights protection and constitutional 
courts’ competence to review the standard of such protection could, how-
ever, at least be mitigated when the Fundamental Rights Charter adopted 
by the EU Summit of 23 June 2007 comes into force. In its Solange I deci-
sion, the BVerfG based its competence to review and overrule Community 
legal acts according to the fundamental rights standard of the Grundg-
esetz on the lack of a written charter of fundamental rights adopted by 
a parliament,79 and merely refrained from exercising this competence in 
Solange II.80 The coming into force of the Fundamental Rights Charter 
would mean that this argument for its competence to review Community 
legal acts is no longer valid. 
The BVerfG regards the European Parliament’s participation in the 
legislative process as merely a ‘supporting function’ for the democratic 
accountability of Community legislation, viewing the main pillar of such 
accountability in the feedback from Member State parliaments on acts 
by European organs.81 Democratic accountability could be enforced by 
increasing the European Parliament’s infl uence on EC legislation and 
policy.82 The Trybuna , for its part, regards the European Parliament not 
as a legislative organ executing state power in the Republic of Poland, but 
rather as an ‘organ which executes specifi ed functions in the institutional 
structure of the EU’.83 From this it may be inferred that both constitu-
tional courts regards the legislative competences lacking to the European 
Parliament as a defi cit of democracy, and therefore as an obstacle to 
deeper integration if not promptly addressed.84 Strengthening the Euro-
78  Cf Matthias Herdegen, Europarecht (7th edn Beck, Munich 2005) § 11 recital 5; Klemens 
Fischer, Der Europäische Verfassungsvertrag, Texte und Kommentar (1st edn Nomos, Baden-
Baden 2005) 130. 
79  BVerfGE 37, 271.
80  BVerfGE 73, 339 (340).
81  BVerfGE 89, 155 (185); cf Herdegen (n 78) § 8 recital 69.
82  BVerfGE 89, 155 (186).
83  K 15/04 No 6.
84  Cf BVerfGE 89, 155 (186). 
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pean Parliament is required in order to remedy this defi cit of democracy 
at the Community level. 
VI. ‘Infl uence’ of the BVerfG on the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny? 
Firstly, it may be stated that the legal culture of Polish constitu-
tional jurisprudence corresponds to the Central European constitutional 
culture whose archetype is the German Federal Constitutional Court.85 
Since the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny’s array of competences and, therefore, 
its position in the state structure are equivalent to the BVerfG’s, a trans-
fer of the solutions already discussed and adopted by the BVerfG recom-
mends itself. Also, the fact that Polish academic discussion, eg the recent 
debates concerning the decisions on the European Arrest Warrant, has 
pointed to parallels between the jurisprudence of the BVerfG and the 
Trybuna  Konstytucyjny on Community law86 may be interpreted as a 
sign that the BVerfG serves as a point of reference for Polish constitu-
tional jurisprudence. However, one can only speculate as to the extent 
to which the BVerfG has guided Polish constitutional judges in matters 
of Community law. In the reasoning of the latter’s decisions relevant to 
Community law, there is, in any case, no direct reference to BVerfG ju-
risprudence.87 
VII. Conclusion
To recapitulate, far more parallels than differences may be found be-
tween the legal positions of the Trybuna  Konstytucyjny and the BVerfG. 
Both constitutional courts, which operate on similar constitutional foun-
dations, have similar approaches to the relationship between national 
law and Community law, the national judiciary’s competences with re-
gard to Community legal acts, and the relationship between constitu-
tional courts and the ECJ. Solutions which are unsatisfactory in theory 
should be redressed by giving the Community clearer and more sustain-
able legal foundations, in order to minimise the potential for confl ict aris-
ing from the contrary positions of the national constitutional courts and 
the ECJ. Only in this way can deeper, more comprehensive integration 
and possible further enlargement be managed without posing any threat 
to the community of law.
85  See Kühn (n 1) 6.
86  Cf Adam Górski and Andrzej Sakowicz, ‘Uwagi na tle wyroku Trybuna u Konstytucyjnego 
z dnia 27 kwietnia 2005 r. (sygn. akt P 1/05) w sprawie zgodności art. 607t § 1 KPK z art. 
55 ust. 1 Konstytucją’ (2005) 1 Europejski Przegląd Sadowy 2.
87  SK 33/03; K 15/04, K 18/04, K 24/04, P 1/05, P 8/05.
